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CENTRAL CONSUMER PROTECTION
AUTHORITY–A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
— Vagish K Singh* and Ashish K Singh**

Abstract: The Consumer Protection Act, 2019 paved the way for
a familiar yet new regime of consumer governance in India by
creating the Central consumer Protection Authority. As opposed
to the Consumer Councils, the CCPA’s mandate of regulation has
been empowered with a heavy arsenal of investigation, inquiry and
injunctive actions. The powers of the CCPA are overarching and
have the potential of bridging the gaps left by statutory restrictions
and narrow interpretations adopted by the Consumer Fora and
Commissions under the previous regime.
This paper would examine the potential of the CCPA’s legislative mandate and discuss the interaction of these powers with those
of the quasi-judicial Consumer Commissions. The paper would
further attempt to suggest prudent manners of exercise of powers
by the CCPA by examining the experience of similar foreign regulators such as the Federal Trade Commission, United States of
America.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The Consumer Protection Act 2019 (No.35 of 2019) received the assent
of the President on the 9th of August, 2019 thereby paving way for a familiar yet new regime of consumer governance in India. While engulfing several
vital areas of consumer rights such as e-commerce, online intermediaries, misleading advertisements and product liability within its domain, the Act also
mandated creation of a Central Consumer Protection Authority (hereinafter
‘CCPA’).
Under Section 10 of the Act, 2019 the CCPA or the Central Authority has
a regulatory mandate as opposed to the advisory domain of the Consumer
Protection Councils under Chapter II of the Act. However, even on a broad
reading of Chapter III of the Act, it can be unequivocally concluded that the
CCPA’s mandate of regulation has been empowered with a heavy arsenal of
investigation, inquiry and injunctive actions. The powers of the CCPA therefore are overarching and have the potential of bridging the gaps left by statutory restrictions and narrow interpretations adopted by the Consumer Fora and
Commissions under the previous regime.
The CCPA’s interaction with the array of Consumer Commissions however
is a subject matter of speculation and discussion. This paper would examine the potential of the CCPA’s legislative mandate vis-a-vis powers of the
Consumer Commissions and further attempt to suggest prudent manners of
exercise of its powers by examining the experience of similar foreign regulators such as the Federal Trade Commission, United States of America.
II. CENTRAL CONSUMER PROTECTION
AUTHORITY-POWERS & JURISDICTION

The Act of 2019 inter alia provides for three different statutory bodies
namely:
1. Consumer Protection Councils
2. Central Consumer Protection Authority
3. Consumer Disputes Redressal Commissions (ie the
Commission, State Commission and National Commission).

District

The jurisdiction and duties of each of these bodies prima facie appear to
be distinct and theoretically operate in different contexts. The Consumer
Protection Councils similar to the ones that existed in the Act, 1986; are
sought to be purely advisory, with a hierarchy of the district, state and national
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council and presided over by ex-officio members of the executive or ministers
in charge. The councils have no power of enforcement, adjudication or investigation and it would be prudent to view them as a primary policy making body
created by the statute. The Disputes Redressal Commissions under the new act
are a minor reimagining of the fora that preceded it under the Act, 1986 with
some substantial changes in clauses pertaining to cause of action and jurisdiction. The commissions however are still quasi judicial bodies with powers to
adjudicate upon consumer disputes and pass enforceable awards.1
The CCPA, unlike the Councils or the Commissions is neither a purely regulatory, advisory nor policy making body, nor is entirely adjudicatory & quasi
judicial in nature. The structure of the CCPA is also mostly central and besides
providing for creation of regional offices, the Act does not mandate creation
of any State or District Authorities.2 The CCPA would comprise of the Chief
Commissioner, Commissioners and team of subject matter experts and professionals3 besides an investigation wing headed by a Director - General.4

A. Advisory & Regulatory
The CCPA has been given a general mandate to regulate matters related to
violation of consumer rights, unfair trade practices and misleading advertisements.5 It is vital to note that this right to regulate appears to be conditioned
by the plurality of the terms used in act i.e. as opposed to an inter se dispute
between a consumer & a service provider/manufacturer/seller; the regulatory
right of the CCPA should only be called into action when the rights of consumers in general or as a class are being or could be adversely affected. Under
Section 18 of the Act it has been made unambiguously clear that the CCPA has
the power to protect, promote and enforce rights of ‘consumers as a class’.

1
2

3

4

5

Consumer Protection Act 2019 (hereinafter ‘CPA 2019’), ch IV.
CPA 2019, s 10. The Act, 2019 creates one Central Authority consisting of a Chief
Commissioner and other commissioners. The Authority would be located in New Delhi and
would have regional and other offices as may be required.
CPA 2019, s 13(3). Though the qualifications of the Chief Commissioner or other
Commissioners are not prescribed by the Statute and would be laid down by the Central
Government by appropriate rules, the Act, 2019 specifically provides for engagement of subject matter experts who have special knowledge and experience in the areas of consumer
rights and welfare, consumer policy, law, medicine, food safety, health, engineering, product
safety, commerce, economics, public affairs or administration.
CPA 2019, s 15. The investigation wing has been exclusively created for the purpose of conducting inquiry or investigation under the Act. Headed by the Director-General, the investigation wing would comprise of Directors, Joint Directors, Deputy Directors and Assistant
Directors who have experience in investigations. Qualifications are to be provided by way of
separate rules.
CPA 2019, s 10(1).
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The CCPA also has the power to review safeguards provided under laws
other than the Act, 2019 and recommend remedial measures for such factors
which inhibit enjoyment of consumer rights.6 It may also identify best international practices on consumer rights and recommend adoption of international
covenants.7 The CCPA can undertake and promote research in the field of consumer rights and also encourage NGOs and other consumer protection agencies
to work in cooperation with each other.8 Besides, its role as a statutory think
tank, the CCPA in its advisory capacity can assist the central and state governments on measures to ensure consumer welfare and best practices.
One of the primary regulatory powers of the CCPA is to issue necessary
guidelines to prevent unfair trade practices and protect consumer interests. The
CCPA by combining experiences of various stakeholders, international experiences and expertise of its own subject matter experts, can effectively lay down
best practices, model rules & regulations to regulate the otherwise ambiguous
and unfamiliar domain of unfair trade practices.9
These guidelines would also act as guiding principles for Courts, QuasiJudicial Bodies such as the Consumer Commissions, as well as concerned
departments of various State Governments. There has always been criticism of
the rule/policy making of the Central Government under the Act, 1986 since
the Ministry dealing with Consumer Affairs is not a standalone ministry and is
often plagued with delays due to other urgent portfolio.
The advisory role of the CCPA as illustrated under Section 18 of the Act,
2019 does attract attention towards the similarities of these objectives with
those of the Consumer Protection Councils under the Act, 1986 as well as the
present act. Under the Act, 1986 the Councils were entrusted with the task of
promoting and protecting consumer rights as enunciated therein. Examination
of those rights such as, right to be protected against marketing of hazardous
goods, unfair trade practices, competitive pricing etc does suggest several similarities with the advisory role of the CCPA.10
6
7
8
9

10

CPA 2019, s 18(2)(d).
CPA 2019, s 18(2)(e).
CPA 2019, s 18(2)(h).
CUTS International - Centre for Competition, Investment & Economic Regulation and
Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), “Unfair Trade Practices and
Institutional Challenges in India - An Analysis” (Research Report, 2013) <https://cuts-ccier.
org/pdf/Unfair_Trade_Practices_and_Institutional_Challenges_in_India-An_Analysis.pdf >
accessed 20 April 2020.
Consumer Protection Act 1986, ch II. The Consumer Protection Councils under the earlier
enactment were headed by ex-officio Chairman - the Minister In-charge of Consumer affairs
of the respective Government. There were separate councils at the District, State and National
Level. The Councils were primarily deliberative and recommendatory bodies.
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However what the Council lacked in enforceability and punitive action has
been compensated with investigative and punitive powers of the CCPA. It can
however be a subject matter of discussion whether creation of a separate statutory body with its own requirement of physical infrastructure, manpower,
internal regulations etc would lead to further complications. It can be argued
that the current hierarchy of Consumer Protection Councils could have been
empowered with an investigative wing along with the entire remainder of punitive powers as is in the present act.

B. Inquiry & Investigation
It would not be out of place to state that the most potent and overarching power of the CCPA has been granted in the form of its powers to conduct inquiries and carry out investigations. The Act, 2019 provides for creation
of a dedicated Investigation Wing comprising a Director General, Additional
Director General and such other directors and additional directors. This hierarchy of enforcement officers appears to have its own pyramidal structure for
reporting and conducting its duties under the act.11
Under the scheme of the Act, 2019 inquiry and investigation can be made in
the following cases:
1. Violation of consumer rights,
2. Unfair trade practices,
3. False or Misleading advertisements.
Upon careful examination of Section 17 and 19 of the Act, it is clear that
right to conduct inquiry and investigation is conditioned upon ‘prejudice to the
public interest or to the interests of consumers as a class’. Whether imposition of this condition would restrict the jurisdiction of the CCPA to only cases
which involve multiplicity of claims or matters affecting interests of a large
number of consumers is a subject matter of interpretation and judicial review.
However it would be prudent to observe that the repetitive usage of phrases
such as ‘public interest’ or ‘consumers as a class’ cannot be assumed to be
without reason.
It also ensures by implication that inter se disputes between a consumer and
service provider/manufacturer/seller which do not have ramifications on public
interest or consumers as a class; would be the subject matter of adjudication
before the Consumer Commissions. This is not to mean that merely because
11

CPA 2019, s 15.
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a dispute is inter se between a consumer and service provider/manufacturer/
seller; it would automatically lose its significance on public interest or consumers as a class. The decision therefore whether public interest or consumer rights
as a class are affected, should be upon the wisdom of the CCPA. It is needless
to state that such a decision of the CCPA would be subject matter of judicial
review in case it violates principles of administrative or constitutional law.
The procedure for conducting inquiry or investigation can be divided into
the following steps:
1. Preliminary inquiry
2. Investigation by the Investigation Wing, District Collector or a
Statutory Regulator.
A preliminary inquiry can be initiated by the CCPA either suo motu(ie on
its own motion), on a complaint received or on the directions of the Central
Government.12 The complaint jurisdiction of the CCPA can be invoked by way
of a written complaint under Section 17 of the Act addressed directly to the
Commissioner of the Regional Office or the CCPA directly. The Section also
provides a complaint to be addressed to the district collector and in case such
a complaint is made, the district collector may after appropriate inquiry submit
his report to the CCPA or Regional Commissioner. It is unclear whether upon
receipt of a ‘positive report’ i.e. a report alleging violation of consumer rights
etc; the CCPA would be bound by the inquiry and conclusion of the district
collector.
More so because under Section 19, after conduct of the preliminary inquiry
the CCPA is mandated by the use of the phrase ‘shall cause investigation’
to direct an investigation be conducted by the DG or the District Collector.
Therefore, if a consumer or group of consumers forward a complaint to the
District Collector who thereupon conducts a inquiry or investigation under
Section 16 of the Act, 2019; the District Collector’s report forwarded to the
CCPA would possibly lead to multiple investigations i.e. first by the district
collector, secondly by the CCPA and thirdly by either the Investigation Wing
or the District Collector himself.
It would therefore be proper to harmoniously enforce these provisions of
law and upon receipt of a complaint; the district collector must not of his own
volition conduct inquiry or investigation without prior intimation to the CCPA.
Only after the report is forwarded and the CCPA is satisfied of existence of a
12

CPA 2019, s 17. Definition of ‘Complaint’ under s 2(6) would also be applicable to this provision and hence a complaint would mean a written allegation by a complainant [s 2(5)].
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prima facie case under Section 19 of the Act, the subsequent procedures would
be adopted i.e. investigation by the Investigation Wing or the District Collector
himself.
The manner of conduct of preliminary inquiry has not been specifically provided by the Act and the only guidance available is use of the phrase ‘existence of a prima facie case’. The satisfaction of the CCPA therefore must be
guided by general principles for ascertaining existence of a prima facie case.13
The CCPA shall therefore upon receipt of a complaint examine whether on the
face of the record and available documents the allegations made in the complaint are fit for investigation.
The CCPA may before recording its satisfaction give an opportunity of
being heard to the erring party; however such option should only be exercised
where in the wisdom of the CCPA there exists a lacunae capable of being
ascertained in a prima facie inquiry as to the truth of the allegation and not
in the manner of a detailed fact finding exercise at the preliminary stage. This
was not the intention of the legislature, since the investigation is to be carried
out by the Investigation Wing or District Collector subsequent to a preliminary
inquiry; while strictly adhering to principles of natural justice and provisions
of the Code of Criminal Procedure wherever applicable.
As discussed in the foregoing paragraphs the CCPA after concluding the
preliminary inquiry and upon recording satisfaction of existence of a prima
facie case, can direct either the Investigation Wing, District Collector or any
statutory regulator for conduct of an investigation. The Act does not provide
a definition of the term ‘investigation’, however borrowing interpretations of
the CrPC.14 it can be stated that investigation within the meaning of the Act,
2019 would imply collection of evidence by the investigating authority i.e. the
Investigation Wing or District Collector. The Act however would not be able to
guide investigation carried out by a statutory regulator if a reference is made
to such regulator; since such investigation would be governed by applicable Act
& Rules.
The Act, 2019 does provide some guidance as to the manner in which investigation is to be carried out. The investigating agency is empowered to direct
production of any document or record in possession of a person. It is however
pertinent to note that Section 19(3) of the act only empowers the investigating
agency to direct production of documents or record in possession of a person
‘referred to in sub section (1)’. Subsection (1) while using the word ‘person’
13
14

Nirmala J Jhala v State of Gujarat, (2013) 4 SCC 301.
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, s 2(h).
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refers to the person who has allegedly violated consumer rights, or carried out
unfair trade practices or misleading advertisements.
The investigating agency therefore has authority for production of documents in custody of only such a person or persons. Needless to state the term
person as defined in Section 2(31) of the Act would mean an individual, firm,
HUF, Society, AoP, Company etc; however even the overarching definition of
person would not overcome the limitation artificially inserted by Section 19(3).
The custody of documents and records in India has been a matter of concern
due to the lack of punitive provisions for lack of maintenance of such records;
unlike stricter rules in jurisdictions such as the USA.15 There is a potential of
abuse of such a provision leading to litigation due to the complex corporate
structures of several companies. It would have been prudent to provide the
investigating agency with an overarching power of production of documents
Similar to powers of the civil court for production of documents and summoning of witnesses.16
The investigative powers of the CCPA are most akin to powers granted
to statutory bodies such as the National Women’s Rights Commission or the
National Commission for protection of Child Rights. The National Women’s
Rights Commission Act, 2005 provides the commission powers to conduct
investigation and inquiry upon receipt of complaint or on suo motu cognizance.
The act also empowers the commission with the powers of the civil court specifically for production of documents, summoning of witnesses, requisitioning
public documents and receiving evidence on affidavits.17 Similar powers have
been granted to the National Commission for protection of Child Rights under
its parent enactment.18
It is therefore unclear why the powers of the CCPA have been restricted in
the manner aforementioned. Collection of evidence whether by way of production of documents by interested persons or by requisitioning of government
records can perhaps be one of the most vital activities to be carried out by a
fact finding body such as the CCPA. Whether the introduction of such a power
by way of subordinate legislation would be constitutional or not can become a
subject matter of litigation since the parent Act does not grant any such power
to the CCPA. However without such powers, the CCPA is bound to struggle in
the efficient recording of evidence.
15

16
17
18

Bradley J Schaufenbuel, E-Discovery and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (IT
Governance Publishing, 2007) 10.
Civil Procedure Code 1908, Or. XI, XIII and XVI.
National Commission for Women Act 1990, s 10(4).
National Commission for Protection of Child Rights Act 2005, s 14.
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The collection of evidence as aforementioned is statutorily mandated to be
accompanied with grant of an opportunity of being heard to the person against
whom allegations have been made. The opportunity must not be a mere formality or illusion and the CCPA should follow strict rules while granting an
opportunity of hearing. The statute however does not mandate grant of opportunity of cross examination of witnesses or examination of all relevant documents on the basis of which either show cause has been issued or investigation
is being carried out. Inclusion of these rights would defeat the purpose of the
investigation and make it slow & cumbersome.
On the other hand, since the investigation process is not followed by a trial
or a formal adjudication, one would argue that lack of grant of opportunity of
cross examination would vitiate the entire process and take away the right of
the accused/erring person to confront the evidence. Parity can be drawn with
similar investigative and quasi judicial proceedings conducted by tax authorities where lack of grant of opportunity of cross examination has been held to
be fatal to the entire assessment process.19 Since the investigation process of
the CCPA falls in an ambiguous category of proceedings, the rules of procedure governing the investigation need to find a balance between the sanctity of
the investigative process and the rights of the erring person.

C. Search & Seizure
To supplement the powers of investigation granted to the CCPA and the
investigation wing, the Act, 2019 grants powers of search and seizure to the
Director General, authorized subordinate officers or District Collector as the
case may be.20 The parameter for exercising the power of search and seizure
under the act, is the existence of a ‘reason to believe’ of violation of consumer
rights, unfair trade practices or misleading advertisements. The term reason to
believe has been interpreted by Hon’ble Courts of law in several para materia
legislations.21
It is an established principle of law that before grant of authorization of a
search and seizure, reason to believe must be established based upon the available facts and recorded by the relevant authority.22 Such reason to believe
should be based upon reasonable facts and cannot be fanciful or arbitrary.
23
This thereby means that powers of search and seizure should not be exercised
19
20
21
22
23

CCE v Milton Polyplas (I) (P) Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 545 : (2019) 3 Bom CR 459.
CPA 2019, s 22.
Income Tax Act 1995, Central Excise Act 1944, Central Goods and Services Tax Act 2017.
Union of India v Agarwal Iron Industries, (2014) 15 SCC 215.
Tata Chemicals Ltd. v Commr. of Customs, (2015) 11 SCC 628. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
held that, “Statutes often use expressions such as ‘deems it necessary’, ‘reason to believe’, etc.
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by the CCPA in a routine manner without application of mind. The power of
search and seizure are further conditioned by application of the provisions
related to search and seizure under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.24
It is pertinent to note that though the CCPA has not been granted powers of a civil court to ensure production of relevant documents as aforementioned; under Section 22(1)(c) a provision has been made whereby the CCPA
can require any person to produce any record, document or article. The power
of production of relevant documents therefore has been granted to the CCPA
only after recording its satisfaction for reason to believe and issuing appropriate warrant as per the CrPC; which is admittedly a higher threshold.

D. Injunction & Penalty
The powers of inquiry granted to the NCW or NCPCR appear prima facie
to be similar to those granted to the CCPA. However substantial differentiation between these authorities arises from the consequences of such inquiries or investigation. Whereas the NCW or NCPCR are regulatory authorities
with powers of merely recommending criminal action or requesting injunctive orders from the State25; the CCPA has been legislatively endowed to issue
enforceable orders. Under the Act, 2019 the CCPA has the power to issue the
following orders:
(a) Recalling of goods or withdrawal of services;
(b) Reimbursement to purchasers;
(c) Discontinuation of unfair practices;
(d) Discontinuation of advertisements;
(e) Penalty for misleading advertisements;
(f) Prohibitory order against endorser of misleading advertisements;
(g) Penalty on publisher of misleading advertisements.
Noncompliance of the aforementioned orders would warrant criminal action
(ie imprisonment and/or fine).26 In addition to the power to issue the aforementioned orders, the Act, 2019 also empowers the CCPA to be the sole authorized

24
25

26

Suffice it to say that these expressions have been held not to mean the subjective satisfaction
of the officer concerned. Such power given to the officer concerned is not an arbitrary power
and has to be exercise in accordance with the restraints imposed by law”.
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, ch VII.
Swagata Raja and Archana Mehendale, ‘Children’s Commissions - A Case of State Apathy’
(2014) 49(3) Economic & Political Weekly 17.
CPA 2019, s 88.
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complainant for filing criminal complaints against manufacturers or service
providers who cause publication of a false or misleading advertisement.27 This
provision is very strongly worded and mandates punishment with imprisonment and fine.
III. CCPA & CONSUMER COMMISSIONS - AN OVERLAP?

Besides the creation of the CCPA, the Act, 2019 also refurbishes the adjudicatory bodies under the Act, 1986. The hierarchy of District Forum, State
Commission and National Commission has been given a second birth by
creation of the District, State and National Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commissions under the new enactment. Besides the superficial change in
nomenclature, there has been an increase in pecuniary limits of each commission as well as introduction of more convenient rules of territorial jurisdiction.
While beyond the scope of this paper, it is apt to state that most of these are
welcome changes in favor of the consumer.
Upon examination of the regulatory, investigative and injunctive powers
of the CCPA under the Act, 2019 as aforementioned, it is inevitable to make
a comparison of these powers with the adjudicatory powers of the Consumer
Commissions. The standing committee on Food, Consumer affairs and public distribution in its Ninth Report on the Consumer Protection Bill, 2015
expressed serious concerns of overlaps between the judicial powers of the consumer commissions and quasi-judicial powers if granted to the CCPA. This
concern was primarily fueled by the objections received from stakeholders
from the industrial sector.28
On the one hand it is naive to assume that the two are exclusive to each
other and would not overlap, but on the other hand it cannot be stated that the
overlap would be intrusive in nature. The jurisdiction of the consumer commissions, whether in the case of deficiency or unfair trade practices is invoked by
a consumer or class of consumers upon filing of a complaint.29 The underlying factor therefore is the existence of a subsisting cause of action and a locus
standing to file the complaint. The rules governing who can file a complaint
are therefore strictly regulated by the act and the Consumer Commissions
being a creature of statute cannot relax such rules.

27
28

29

CPA 2019, s 92.
Standing Committee on Food, Consumer Affairs and Public Distribution - Sixteenth Lok
Sabha, Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution (Department of Consumer
Affairs), The Consumer Protection Bill, 2015 (9th Report, April 2016).
CPA 2019, s 35.
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Unlike a public interest litigation where there is no requirement for locus
standi in the strict sense, the consumer commissions can only entertain a
complaint disclosing a cause of action which has violated the right of a consumer. Such a requirement however is not present in a complaint envisaged to
the CCPA. The only requirement under the Act, 2019 for filing of a complaint
is the existence of facts and evidence which prima facie suggests violation of
rights of consumers or misleading advertisements affecting consumers as a
class.
Assuming a complaint affecting a large number of consumers is admitted by the Consumer Commissions, the next step in the adjudicatory process
would be adducing of evidence in support of such a claim. Such evidence
would primarily have to be produced by the Complainants themselves.
However there is an inherent power asymmetry between the parties. The
corporate entity against whom the complaint has been filed is a professional
organization with more resources to defend the complaint. It is seen from the
past experience of consumer litigation in India that dispute resolution fora
heavily rely on the submissions made by the parties to decide the complaint.
In the present scenario, with complex products, designs and corporate policies, it becomes extremely difficult to collect and produce data related to consumer litigation before commissions. Discovery and production of relevant
documents and evidence therefore becomes extremely cumbersome and time
consuming. This situation worsens further when the documents are claimed
to be privileged, confidential or trade secrets by the entity defending the
complaint.
The consumer commissions therefore lack the powers of inquiry and investigation which the CCPA has been given under the Act, 2019. The dedicated
investigation wing headed by a Director General is required to be a highly specialized body whose function is to work with the help of subject matter experts
(industry wise) in order to investigate complaints. From the experience of FTC,
in imposing sanctions inter alia on Cambridge Analytica30 and Facebook,31 it is
30

31

Cambridge Analytica LLC, a Corporation (Federal Trade Commission USA, 25 November
2019). Allegations of collection of Facebook data from users of Facebook application and that
users were falsely told the app would not collect users names or other identifiable information.
The Federal Trade Commission, USA prohibited such misrepresentation and directed adherence to EU-US privacy shield frameworks. It further directed deletion of data in violation of
such standards.
United States of America v Facebook, Inc., a Corporation (United States District Court for
the District of Columbia, 24 July 2019). In 2012 the Federal Trade Commission had charged
Facebook with eight privacy related violations. Facebook agreed to settle that case and among
other things agreed to implement a privacy program. However on discovery of violations
of the order by Facebook, enforcement action was initiated by the FTC which resulted in
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clear that subject matter expertise is critical in the ever-changing technology
oriented world. Without the powers of the CCPA, it is not possible (or highly
unlikely) that a consumer body or a class of consumers on their own can collect information to successfully make and sustain a complaint before the consumer commissions.
Most day to day products and services that a common consumer interacts
with are low cost items (ie the compensation paid by a consumer is a meager
amount). The maximum number of issues however arises out of such low cost
products such as soaps, diet supplements, food delivery services etc. Whether
it is the misleading advertising about these products/services or the quality of
the product itself, the majority of such consumer grievances are not taken up
by the consumer due to the low cost paid. The total time, money and energy
involved in approaching a complex set of dispute resolution commissions is
therefore too great a cost for a common consumer.
It is often difficult for most consumers to retain evidence such as purchase
invoices or wrappers with regard to these low cost - high volume goods. The
experience in consumer commissions is further unsatisfactory since the principle being followed by most consumer fora is calculation of injury mostly on
the basis of irrelevant factors including cost of the product/service. A major
portion of consumer grievances thus go unaddressed due to the quasi judicial
and formal nature of the Consumer Commissions. The CCPA however can play
a major role in dealing with such grievances which affect a large number of
consumers even though the initial compensation paid for an individual product/
service is much lower.
The power to conduct a preliminary inquiry upon complaint can be put to
good use by prima facie establishing whether a low cost good has overarching ramifications on the entire market and on a large number of consumers. If
such a prima facie case is found, a full-fledged investigation by the CCPA can
be initiated. These measures would effectively control the menace of false and
misleading advertising for low cost goods as well as large scale quality issues
affecting the common public.
It can thus be argued that it is entirely possible for the Consumer
Commissions and CCPA to co-exist and complement each other. The CCPA
has also been granted the power to file appropriate complaints before the
Consumer Commissions or act as a necessary party or intervener wherever it
deems fit in the interest of the public at large. It is clear from the experience of
imposition of one of the largest penalties in the history of consumer governance. Facebook
agreed to make payment of $5 billion dollars for its violations.
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the erstwhile consumer fora that even while following the principle of staredecisis, each consumer forum appears to have operated in its own silo. This has a
profound effect when issues with regard to a product or service arise across the
country owing to a deficiency which affects the public at large.
In such a circumstance there is no singularity of investigation or evidence
and each case proceeds at its own pace and subject to the amount of information available to each complainant. This lack of any organic relation between
similar disputes in various consumer fora is further aggravated by the methods
of calculation of compensation which appear to be very personal and specific
to each consumer; often leading to meager compensation amounts. The erring
respondent therefore is never penalized or corrected in any manner which has a
long lasting effect on the entire marketplace.
It is also pertinent to note that a Consumer Commission’s power of granting of a relief is primarily limited to inter se the parties to the dispute. The
consumer commission therefore while granting declaratory relief in rem is perhaps stretching its own jurisdiction to better deter the erring respondent from
continuing an activity. The CCPA actively fills these lacunae in the earlier law
as well as the present enactment. The investigation process is now streamlined
and unified and the consequences can be overarching with the consequence of
governing the whole market.
IV. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION - LESSONS TO BE LEARNT

The powers of the CCPA as discussed in the foregoing paragraphs seem
to draw inspiration from the Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter ‘FTC’)
of the United States of America. The FTC is a creature of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 1914 which came into force on September 26, 1914.32 The
FTC replaced the already existing Bureau of Corporations and took over all
pending investigations of the Bureau in 1914.33 The FTC however was originally created as a body to primarily deal with unfair methods of competition. The Act, 1914 as it stood originally provided the FTC the right to
conduct inquiry and issue cease and desist orders to persons or corporations
found indulged in unfair methods of competition.34 However the FTC has
since evolved into a behemoth with three distinct bureaus i.e. the Bureau of
Competition, Bureau of Consumer Protection and the Bureau of Economics.
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The Bureau of Consumer Protection of the FTC shares several key features
with the CCPA under the Indian Consumer Protection Act, 2019. The Bureau
of Consumer Protection enforces laws related to Consumer Protection in the
USA such as the Consumer Protection Act, 2005, Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Act, Consumer Leasing Act, Consumer Review Fairness Act
among many others. The Bureau also enforces specific laws related to unfair
trade practices and misleading advertisements such as the Fair Packaging and
Labeling Act, Federal Cigarette Labeling and advertising act, Fur Products
Labeling Act, Packers and Stockyards Act, Petroleum Marketing Practices Act
among others.
The FTC and Bureau of Consumer Protection enforce the aforementioned
mandate by separate divisions dedicated to Privacy, Advertising, Consumer
Education, Marketing, Financial Practices as well as a dedicated Division of
Enforcement. The various divisions of the Bureau conduct investigations into
their respective areas of jurisdiction which are then enforced by the enforcement division.
The primary law enforcement power of the FTC is derived from Section 5
of the Act which declares that all unfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts affecting commerce are unlawful. It is also pertinent to note that
the term “interest of the public” is found in Section 5 of the Act quite akin
to similar terminologies used in the Indian Act, 2019 while granting powers
to the CCPA. As suggested in the foregoing paragraphs with reference to the
exercise of powers by the CCPA, the FTC while interpreting Section 5 has
interpreted the requirement of “interest of the public” to mean that individual disputes between a consumer and a company or between competitors are
beyond the scope of Section 5.35
There are several lessons which can be learnt by the long and rich history
of the FTC which now spans more than 100 years. The Indian CCPA has been
given a substantial burden of regulatory and enforcement duties which need
to be carried out in a scientific and systematic manner. However if the experience of the FTC is to be taken cognizance of, then it is quite evident that
merely a regime of investigative and injunctive action against offending persons by initiating individual cases has limited effect on the overall fairness of
the market. The FTC soon realized that the litigation or investigative resources
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of its bureau were insufficient to address the large number of fraud and misrepresentations in the market.36
It was thus found that to effectively govern and control the marketplace to
benefit each consumer, the FTC has to adopt proactive measures to control the
behavior of the manufacturer or service provider. The ‘Holder in Due Course
Rule’, ‘Care Labeling Rule’ and the ‘Octane Rule’ adopted by the FTC in the
late 1970s are some examples of creative usage of the rule making powers of
the FTC to achieve high levels of compliance while consuming low levels of
resources of the agency.37 These innovative and proactive methods adopted by
the FTC need to carefully examine by the CCPA and its functionaries to fulfill
its mandate which admittedly is enormous and overarching.
In the examination of the powers of the CCPA in the foregoing paragraphs,
it is evident to note that the Act, 2019 is surprisingly silent on powers of
interim injunctions or temporary injunctions during the pendency of any complaint or investigation process. This is problematic since the CCPA is not a
court of law or a constitutional court with inherent powers to prevent abuse of
its process during the pendency of an investigation. Being a creature of statute,
the CCPA is bound to follow the mandate of the Act, 2019 and can pass orders
of injunction, penalty, compensation etc only upon completion of the inquiry
and investigation process. This however is contrary to the experience of the
FTC in several instances.
Prior to 1973, the FTC did not possess any powers of issuing temporary
restraining orders or preliminary injunctions. This however led to a chaotic situation because the only recourse left to the FTC for addressing the large number of consumer wrongs was to initiate and complete lengthy investigations
and administrative inquiries. As aforementioned, such an exercise burdens the
machinery of a regulating authority and thus the FTC had to resort to hybrid
methods of regulation to govern its wide mandate.38 This undoubtedly led to a
rich development of policies and rule making exercises by the FTC, but given
the difficulties faced by its authorities, the Federal Trade Commission Act was
amended in 1973 to grant powers of issuing temporary restraining orders and
preliminary injunctions.39
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It is unfortunate to note that even after the experience of the FTC is well
recorded and deliberated by several jurists, the Indian CCPA has not been
granted any express powers of grant of temporary injunction during the pendency of the investigation process. This lacunae is more damaging in instances
such as misleading advertisement where the shelf life and purpose of the
advert is fulfilled even before the preliminary inquiry is completed or investigation initiated. To further dampen the enforceability of the Act, 2019 the
monetary penalty under Section 21 of the Act has been statutorily limited to
Rs.10,00,000/- (First Offence) and Rs. 50,00,000/- for subsequent offences.40
Meaning thereby that firstly the CCPA would be unable to pass any interim
orders restricting circulation of a purported misleading advertisement and
Secondly even if the advertisement is found to be misleading the same would
result in a minor penalty of a maximum of Rs.50,00,000/-. It is noted that
Section 89 of the Act, 2019 provides for criminal action (ie imprisonment and
fine); however the burden of proof in such criminal cases would be even higher
and the procedure more cumbersome and complex.
Once the FTC has concluded its investigation and it is found that a service provider, manufacturer or advertiser has committed an unfair practice or
deceptive act, the approach of the FTC is both restitutive and deterrent. The
restitutive part of the approach is consumer centric (ie to say that the Order
of the FTC should restitute aggrieved consumers due to the loss caused by
the deceptive practice). The deterrent is of course focused upon the erring individual or corporate and simply aims to deter future violations. For
instance, in a complaint involving misleading advertisements the Order of
the FTC can be a cease-and-desist order, requiring the advertiser to stop
disseminating deceptive claims and payment of monetary compensation.41
However the most important lesson to be learnt from the FTC experience is
the development of the ‘Fencing-in remedy’ which has been affirmed by the
Supreme Court of the United States of America in the Ruberoid Company
Case42 and several subsequent orders. Fencing-in remedy is simply provisions
directed not only against the form of deception under question, but also against
other forms of violations that reasonably relate to the past deception.43 The
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orders of the FTC therefore laid down several standards across the industry
irrespective of the complainant or respondent involved.
Another aspect of the orders of the FTC which should be adopted by the
CCPA is the prospective nature of its cease-and-desist orders. In several examples, the Orders of the FTC have directed erring respondents to ensure periodic compliance for as long as the next 20 years by filing of yearly compliance
reports with regard to its marketing activities and steps taken to ensure future
compliance.44
Section 21 of the Indian Act, 2019 provides a rather interesting power of
modifying any advertisement which is found to be misleading or false. The
power of modification however should not be merely exercised to delete portions of advertisements which are misleading. The FTCs approach of informational remedies i.e. corrective advertising needs to be encapsulated by the
CCPA under its power of modification under Section 21. The principle behind
corrective advertising has consistently been that mere ceasing or terminating
an advertisement does not undo the injury inflicted by a misleading advertisement or representation.45
Affirmative steps are sometimes mandated to terminate continuing ill
effects of a misleading or false advertisement. These affirmative steps may be
in the form of a disclosure in an advertisement or a label to alert consumers
of possible risk.46 In the Indian context, corrective advertising is even more
important since the perceptions created by false advertisements have long lasting impacts on persons from low income and low education backgrounds. If
corrective advertising is read into Section 21 of the Act, 2019, it may possibly
undo the legislative lacunae of lack of interim orders and limited penalties.
V. CONCLUSION

The Act, 2019 has created a behemoth regulatory body in the form of the
CCPA. Its powers of investigation and injunctive action are capable of having
huge ramifications in the manner in which the Indian market is perceived by
manufacturers, sellers, service providers and advertisers alike. In a way, the
competence and efficiency of the CCPA has the potential of equalizing the disparity between corporate giants and consumers from all walks of life including
less privileged, backward or less educated persons.
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However, as discussed in the present paper, to achieve this utopian condition the CCPA needs to tread extremely cautiously and efficiently utilize all the
weapons in its arsenal. It needs to learn from the mistakes and best practices
of similar regulators such as the FTC and build upon the foundation of consumer welfare which has been laid down by consumer welfare organizations in
India over the past 4 decades.
On the other hand, draconian exercise of the powers of the CCPA to coerce
the market and its players can be more harmful than the evil such exercise
aims to address. A free, fair and competitive market is the best self regulator
and suo motu creates ideal conditions and options for a consumer. The CCPA
therefore must not act merely as an enforcer or henchman for consumer protection, rather it must balance its powers of regulation, rule-making, investigation
and injunction to create a better marketplace.
The overlaps with powers of the consumer commissions are incidental and
if the provisions are read harmoniously as stated in the preceding paragraphs,
the CCPA and CDRCs will complement each other’s functioning. Cooperation
of these two regulatory and adjudicatory bodies can further achieve the
intended goal of the Act, 2019.

